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Observers of the European airline industry have long believed that the °ag-carrier system,
though a±rming national pride, has created too many airlines and led to ine±cient excess
capacity. The suggested remedy is consolidation of the European industry via cross-border
mergers, an avenue that is now open as a result of EU deregulation. The ¯rst major consolida-
tion event is currently unfolding, with the proposed AirFrance-KLM merger recently approved
by EU regulators.
Because most major international carriers belong to one of the global alliances, European
airline mergers can upset the alliance structure, leading to further realignments that extend
beyond the localized e®ects of the merger itself. With Air France and KLM belonging to di®er-
ent global alliances, their merger is expected generate exactly this kind of secondary impact.
In particular, KLM's current alliance partner, Northwest, is expected to join the SkyTeam
alliance, whose major partners are Air France and Delta, with Continental (Northwest's long-
time domestic alliance partner) joining as well. In e®ect, the Air France-KLM merger will
lead to consolidation of the Northwest-KLM alliance and the SkyTeam alliance, creating a
mega-alliance containing four of the world's largest airlines.
The present paper o®ers an economic analysis of the impacts of this kind of merger, and
the related alliance consolidation, using a stylized model of airline networks. The analysis
is prompted by the concern that such a merger of carriers and alliances will generate e®ects
that are mostly anticompetitive, leading to a likely negative impact on consumer welfare.
In particular, the European merger itself will reduce competition in intra-European city-pair
markets and in transatlantic markets where the merger partners compete. In addition, the
alliance consolidation will reduce interalliance competition for passengers traveling between
1smaller US and European endpoints, who rely on interline service jointly provided by two
alliance partners. While such passengers currently bene¯t from competition between di®erent
alliances, such competition will be reduced when these separate pairings collapse into one
mega-alliance.
The analysis, which makes use of an airline network model like that introduced by Brueck-
ner and Spiller (1991), con¯rms the suspicion that the merger and alliance consolidation are
harmful to passengers and to society in general. Although the setup of the model, which omits
some possible e±ciency gains, may lead to an overstatementofthe harmful e®ectsofthe merger
in intra-European markets, the negative verdict on the impact of alliance consolidation seems
unequivocal. The paper thus suggests that regulators should not accede to a full integration
of the Northwest-KLM and SkyTeam alliances even though the Air France-KLM merger has
been approved.
Although the overall negative conclusions of the analysis come as no surprise given the
anticompetitive nature of the merger and the associated alliance consolidation, the results do
o®er some unexpected insights. In particular, even though anticompetitive e®ects are directly
felt in only a few city-pair markets in the model, fares rise and tra±c falls in almost every
market served by the carriers. This outcome re°ects the existence of negative spillovers across
markets, which are transmitted by economies of tra±c density.1 With economies of density,
greateroperating e±cienciesreduce costper passenger on a route as tra±c volume on the route
rises. In the model, when anticompetitive e®ects reduce tra±c in a given city-pair market,
tra±c density falls on the route(s) used to serve that market, raising cost per passenger on
these routes. However, in a network setting, passengers traveling in city-pair markets where
competition is unchanged will in some cases °ow across these same higher-cost routes, paying
higher fares as a result (with a consequent reduction in tra±c volumes). Through such cost
impacts, localized anticompetitive e®ects can be transmitted across airline networks, and the
analysis illustrates in graphic fashion how such spillovers can occur.
In previous work, Brueckner (2001, 2003a) and Brueckner and Whalen (2000) emphasized
the bene¯ts of alliances, and it is importantto understand the di®erence between this view and
the negative conclusions of the present paper. This previous research drew a contrast between
2interline service provide by alliance partners and service provided by nonallied carriers. The
papers showed theoretically that alliance partners should charge a lower fare for interline trips
than carriers with no alliance relationship, and empirical work strongly con¯rmed the existence
in the data of this alliance fare discount. The research thus established that alliances are good
for interline passengers, with lower fares reinforcing any convenience gains the passengers may
enjoy.2 In the present analysis, however, these alliance bene¯ts are already exhausted because
all interline passengers are assumed in the model to make alliance trips. The only e®ect of
creation of the mega-alliance is thus to remove interalliance competition, without creating
any new alliance travel. The appropriateness of this setup, which rules out any bene¯ts from
alliance consolidation, is discussed in paper's concluding section.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the network structure of the model
and explains how competition is a®ected by the merger and alliance consolidation, using two
di®erentscenarios. Section 3 develops revenue and cost expressions for the carriers, making use
ofthe setup from section 2. Thissection istechnical and can be skipped by uninterested readers
without loss of continuity. Section 4 imposes speci¯c functional forms on demand and cost and
presents general results regarding the e®ect of the merger and alliance consolidation, which
hold for all feasible parameter values. Section 5 o®ers a speci¯c numerical example based on
representative parametervalues. Extensive discussion of thisexample provides intuitive insight
into the results generated by the model. Section 6 o®ers conclusions.
2. The Setup
The model has two US airlines, denoted 1 and 2, and two European airlines, denoted 3 and
4. Airlines 1 and 3 are alliance partners, while 2 and 4 are matched in a separate alliance. The
carriers operate the networks shown in Figure 1, where A, B and E denote US cities and C, D
and F denote European cities. Carrier 1 uses city A as its hub and operates routes from this
hub to cities B, C, D and E (the routes are indicated by the heavy solid lines in the Figure).
Carrier 2 uses city B as its hub and operates routes to A, C, D and E (indicated by the lighter
solid lines). Carrier 3 uses city C as its hub and operates routes to A, B, D and F (indicated
by the heavy dotted lines). Finally, carrier 4 uses D as its hub and operates routes to A, B, C
3and F (indicated by the lighter dotted lines). Note that for simplicity, Europe and the US are
portrayed as having only one non-hub endpoint each (E and F). A more realistic model with
many such endpoints would yield results similar to those derived below.
The collection of cities shown in Figure 1 generates 15 city-pair markets, which are listed
in the ¯rst column of Table 1. City-pair markets are non-directional, with travel in the market
consisting of round-trip travel originating at either endpoint city (endpoints are thus listed in
alphabetical order).
2.1. The base case
The base case represents the premerger situation, where airlines 3 and 4 operate indepen-
dently. The following discussion explains the patterns of service and competition in the 15
city-pair markets for this case. The discussion, which also introduces a number of assumptions
underlying the analysis, is summarized in the second and third columns of Table 1.
Market AB, which connects the hubs of carriers 1 and 2, is served by both of these carriers,
who behave as competitors. Similarly, market CD, which connects the hubs of airlines 3 and
4, is served by both carriers, who also compete for passengers. AE is a monopoly market
served by carrier 1, while BE is a monopoly market served by carrier 2. In parallel fashion,
CF and DF are monopoly markets served by airlines 3 and 4, respectively. Market AD is a
transatlantic market connecting the hubs of carriers 1 and 4, and it is served competitively by
both carriers. Similarly, airlines 2 and 3 compete in the transatlantic interhub market BC.
MarketCE, which connectsthe European hub C to the interior US endpoint E, is served by
airline 1 through its hub A and by airline 2 through its hub B. Similarly, market DE is served
by carriers 1 and 2 through their respective hubs. Note that passengers must change planes
at one of the hubs when traveling in these markets. In parallel fashion, market BF is served
by airlines 3 and 4 through hubs C and D, respectively, with market AF served in the same
fashion. It should be noted that these service patterns re°ect a key underlying assumption
designed to make the analysis tractable. In particular, interline service is assumed not to
occur in a market where online service is available. Thus, even though a passenger traveling
in market CE could in principle take an interline trip on carriers 1 and 3 (traveling between
A and E on 1 and between A and C on 3), the passenger is assumed to shun such service in
4favor of more-convenient, single-carrier service on airlines 1 or 2. In the same fashion, interline
service in markets DE, AF and BF does not occur. This constraint on service patterns, though
restrictive, appears to be fairly realistic.
The remaining marketsare a®ected by the alliancesbetween the US and European carriers,
which pairairlines1and 3and airlines2and 4. Travel in marketEF, which connectsthe interior
US and European endpoints, requires interline travel, and it is assumed that passengers stay
within one alliance in carrying out such trips. In other words, EF passengers °y either on
airlines 1 and 3 via hubs A and C, or on airlines 2 and 4 via hubs B and D. Nonalliance
interline trips combining carriers 1 and 4 or 2 and 3 are assumed not to occur. Note that
the interline tra±c of carriers 1 and 3 °ows across the interhub route between A and C. The
airlines are assumed to divide this tra±c equally, with half of the 1{3 interline passengers on
the AC route carried by 1 and half by 3. A parallel assumption applies to the 2{4 interline
tra±c °owing across the interhub route BD. Finally, with the EF market served by both the
1{3 and 2{4 alliances, it is assumed that the interline EF fare is determined by interalliance
competition. More detail on EF fare determination is presented below.
Finally, consider market AC, which is served in nonstop fashion by the alliance partners 1
and 3, as well as market BD, which is served by the partner airlines 2 and 4. To characterize
competition in these markets, note that regulatory rulings, which allow alliance partners to
collaborate in settinginterline fares, typically impose a\carve-out" in interhub markets such as
AC and BD. In other words, the usual grantof antitrust immunity does not permit cooperative
pricing in the interhub markets, on the grounds that the presence of overlapping service in
these markets makes such behavior anticompetitive (see Brueckner (2001) and Brueckner and
Whalen (2000)). However, despite the presence of such restrictions, some observers doubt that
carve-out provisions are actually e®ective, wondering how alliance partners can collaborate
extensively while still competing in the markets connecting their hubs. Given this view, the
presentanalysisassumesthatalliance partnerscollude in settingfaresin theirinterhub markets,
implicitly viewing carve-out provisions (if they exist) as ine®ective. This collusion is noted in
the \behavior" column of Table 1 for the base case, which indicates collusion in markets AC
and BD while also showing airline behavior in the remaining markets.
5One ¯nal implicit assumption underlying Table 1 should be noted. In particular, it is
assumed that connecting (change-of-plane) service is never used when nonstop service is avail-
able. For example, although connecting service in market AE is feasible on airline 2 via hub B,
passengers are assumed to shun such service in favor of nonstop service on airline 1. Similarly,
BDpassengers are assumed to shun connecting service on airline 1via Aand connecting service
on airline 3 via C in favor of nonstop service on either airline. Without this assumption, which
applies as well in several additional markets, the analysis would be much more complex.
2.2. Scenarios I and II
Two di®erent merger scenarios are considered in the analysis. Each scenario involves a
merger of airlines 3 and 4 along with consolidation of the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances into a four-
carrier mega-alliance. Scenario II di®ers from scenario I in the degree of cooperation within
the mega-alliance, which is greater under scenario II. To facilitate the discussion of the two
scenarios, the merged airlines 3 and 4 are still labeled separately even though they behave
like a single ¯rm following the merger. While convenient, this approach is also realistic in the
case of the Air France-KLM merger, where the airlines will maintain separate identities for an
extended period despite their common ownership.
Following the merger, airlines 3 and 4 cease to compete in the interhub market CD, setting
fares collusively so as to maximize their joint pro¯t. In addition, the two carriers collude in
markets AF and BF, where they previously competed. These changes are shown in the fourth
column of Table 1.
The merger of airlines 3 and 4 spurs consolidation of the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances into one
mega-alliance, mirroring the likely consolidation of the Northwest-KLM and SkyTeam alliances
asa resultof the AirFrance-KLMmerger. In this case, airline 1 would representNorthwestand
airline 2 would be Delta, with airlines 3 and 4 representing KLM and Air France respectively.
The main e®ect of this alliance consolidation is that the interline fare in market EF is no
longer determined by competition between the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances. Instead, the fare is set
collusively by all four mega-alliance carriers so as to maximize their combined pro¯t.
The additional details of the alliance consolidation di®er between scenarios I and II. Under
scenario I, the interline pairings in the EF market remain as in the base case, with passengers
6traveling either on the 1{3 carrier pair or on the 2{4 pair. Thus, even though competition
between the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances disappears, interline tra±c patterns remain unchanged. By
contrast, under scenario II, all four possible interline pairings are observed. In other words, in
addition to 1{3 and 2{4 interline trips, passengers travel on the 1{4 carrier pair and on the 2{3
pair. Asa result, the AD and BC routes, which carry no EF interline tra±c underthe base case
and scenario I, each get one-quarter of the total interline tra±c under scenario II. Concretely,
scenario I assumes that interline passengers continue to use either Northwest-KLM or Delta-
Air France despite creation of the mega-alliance, while scenario II allows Northwest-Air France
and Delta-KLM interline trips to occur as well.
Consistent with a deeper alliance consolidation, scenario II also allows collusion in city-pair
markets AD and BC, which were previously competitive. This outcome is plausible given that
the mega-alliance will require new grants of antitrust immunity to the carrier pairs 1{4 and
2{3 (e.g., Northwest and Air France will gain immunity, as will Delta and KLM). While such
immunity will allow all four carriers to collude in setting the EF fare, the previous argument
against the e±cacy of carve-outs suggests that immunity will foster collusion by carriers 1 and
4 in interhub market AD and by carriers 2 and 3 in interhub market BC.
These di®erences between scenarios I and II can be reviewed by comparing the last four
columns of Table 1. Looking more generally at the Table as a whole, it is clear that the pro-
gression from the base case toscenario I and then to scenarioII involves successive eliminations
of competition. In going from the base case to scenario I, competition is lost in markets AF,
BF, CD and EF. Further movement to scenario II involves an additional loss of competition
in markets AD and BC, coupled with a change in the split of interline EF tra±c. Given these
reductions in competition, one would expect that the 3{4 merger and the associated alliance
consolidation is bad for consumers and good for the airlines. The remainder of the analysis is
devoted to evaluating this conjecture.
3. Revenues and Costs
The ¯rst step in this evaluation is to derive revenue and cost expressions for the airlines
under the base case and the two scenarios, relying on several simplifying assumptions.3 The
7¯rst assumption is that the demand for air travel is the same in all city-pair markets, with the
fare p in a market given by a common inverse demand function d(Q), where Q is total tra±c in
the market. As suggested above, Q givesthe total number of round-trip passengers traveling in
either direction in the market. Relaxing the assumption of a common demand function would
introduce inessential complexity without a®ecting the main conclusions derived below.
3.1. The base case






























In (1), the Q subscripts denote the individual city-pair markets in self-explanatory fashion,
and the numerical superscripts denote the carriers. If a carrier chooses its tra±c level in a
market in a noncollusive fashion, then only its single superscript is attached to the Q variable.
If carriers collude, then the superscript contains the identities of the carriers engaged in the
collusion.
Using these conventions, interpretation of (1) is straightforward. The ¯rst term gives
airline 1's revenue in market AB, where it competes with carrier 2. Note that price in the
market, given by d(¢), depends on the sum of the carriers' tra±c levels, Q1
AB + Q2
AB. Similar
observations apply to third, ¯fth and sixth terms in (1), which give revenue in the competitive
markets AD, CE and DE. The fourth term represents carrier 1's revenue in its monopoly
market, AE. In market AC, represented by the second revenue term, carriers 1 and 3 collude
in setting a total quantity in the market (hence the 1,3 superscript), with both getting equal
tra±c shares. The last term in (1) represents interline revenue from market EF, with Q
1;3
EF
giving the interline tra±c carried by airlines 1 and 3. Here, collusion consists of agreeing on
a common 1{3 interline tra±c level, recognizing that the fare in the EF market also depends
8on the tra±c choice of the 2{4 alliance partners, Q
2;4
EF. Note that carrier 1 gets half of the 1{3
alliance's EF revenue.
To develop the airline 1's cost expression, let the cost of operating a route be given by
c(V), where V is the total tra±c on the route. The function c(¢) re°ects economies of tra±c
density, with c0 > 0 and c00 < 0 holding. With economies of density, cost per passenger falls
as tra±c volume on a route rises, re°ecting the lower operating cost per seat of larger aircraft,
as well as other e±ciency gains from higher densities (see Caves, Christensen and Tretheway
(1984) and Brueckner and Spiller (1994) for evidence).
With each airline operating four routes, total cost is just the sum of four separate c(¢)
functions evaluated at the appropriate tra±c levels. Any ¯xed costs that a carrier incurs in
operating its hub can be ignored without a®ecting the analysis. Using the tra±c levels from




















The ¯rst term in (2) gives the cost of operating the AB route, which carries tra±c only in
the AB city-pair market. The second term gives the cost of operating the AC route, which
carries half of the tra±c in market AC (the rest is carried by airline 3), airline 1's portion of
CE tra±c, and half of the EF interline tra±c of the 1{3 alliance. The third term gives the
cost of operating the AD route, which carries airline 1's portion of tra±c in the AD and DE
markets. Finally, the fourth term gives the cost of operating the AE route, which carries all
AE tra±c, carrier 1's portion of CE and DE tra±c, and all of the 1{3 alliance's EF interline
tra±c.4
While the other airlines have analogous cost and revenue expressions, it is useful to present
the expressions for airline 3, as they are needed for future comparisons. The relevant expres-






















































Pro¯t for each airline is given by revenue minus cost, and the airlines choose their tra±c
levels in the various markets to maximize either individual pro¯t or the appropriate sum of















EF, which are treated as parametric in choosing the previous variables, are
themselves chosen to maximize the sum of pro¯ts for carriers 1 and 3, with Q
2;4
EF again treated
as parametric in Cournot fashion. This procedure generates seven ¯rst-order conditions, which
equate the relevant marginal revenues and marginal costs, and the analogous procedure for
the three additional carriers generates additional conditions. However, the equilibrium values,
which are symmetric across carriers given the symmetry of the base case, can be determined
from a single set of ¯rst-order conditions.5
3.2. Scenarios I and II
The revenue and cost expressions change under scenario I. For airline 1, revenue under this
scenario is given by
Rev
1








The only di®erence relative to (1) is in the last term, where the Q superscript indicates that
EF tra±c is now chosen collusively by all four airlines, with airline 1 getting one-quarter of
total EF revenue.
10Airline 1's cost under scenario I is given by
Cost1


















and the only di®erences relative to (2) are again related to the EF market. Focusing on the
last term, the AE route carries half of total EF tra±c, and airline 1's AC route (second term)
carries one-quarter of the total.6































The di®erence relative to (3) is that tra±c levels in markets CD, AF and BF are now chosen
collusively with airline 4. The last term in (7) matches airline 1's corresponding EF term in
(5).
Cost for airline 3 under scenario I is given by
Cost3



























where the changes re°ect the di®erences just discussed.7
The revenue and cost expressions under scenario II are not shown in detail, but the further
changes are easily described. First, carrier 1 now colludes with 4 in market AD, so that the




AD). In addition, because of the four-way interline
11split, carrier 1 loses half of its interline tra±c on route AC, causing Q
1;2;3;4
EF =4 in the second
term of (6) to be replaced by Q
1;2;3;4
EF =8. Parallel changes occur for carrier 3, with the third










For both scenarios, parallel changes in the cost expressions apply for carriers 2 and 4.
Once again, tra±c levels are chosen to maximize the appropriate pro¯t expression, equal to
own-pro¯t or the relevant sum of pro¯ts for the colluding carriers. For example, Q
1;2;3;4
EF is
chosen to maximize the sum of pro¯ts for all four airlines. Since the full symmetry of the base
case is disrupted under both scenarios, a larger collection of ¯rst-order conditions is needed to
determine the solution. However, since carriers 1 and 2 remain symmetric, as do 3 and 4, only
two sets of ¯rst-order conditions are required.
4. The Impacts of the Merger and Alliance Consolidation
4.1. Solving for the equilibrium
In order to generate results, more structure must be imposed on the model by assuming
speci¯c functional forms for demand and cost. Following Brueckner and Spiller(1991) and Pels,
Nijkamp and Rietveld (2000), the demand function d(¢) is assumed to be linear, and the cost
function is assumed to be quadratic, generating a linear marginal-cost function. Speci¯cally,
demand is given by d(Q) ´ ® ¡ :5Q while cost is given by c(V ) ´ V ¡:5µV 2, implying that
the marginal-revenue function is ® ¡ Q and that marginal cost is 1 ¡ µV . Note that two
normalizations are imposed, with the marginal-cost intercept and marginal-revenue slope both
normalized to one (the ¯rst normalization can be imposed arbitrarily and the other justi¯ed
by choice of quantity units). The parameter ® thus measures the strength of demand, while
µ measures the strength of economies of density (i.e., the rate at which marginal and average
costs fall as tra±c volume on a route rises).9
Using these functional forms, the ¯rst-order conditions described above can be derived and
solved for the equilibrium tra±c levels under any given scenario. The analytical solutions,
which are computed using the Maple software package, show that the various Q's are compli-
cated ratios of polynomials involving ® and µ. Since these solutions are not of interest in and
12of themselves, they are not reported.
The goal ofthe analysisis tocompare the base-case equilibrium to the equilibrium outcomes
under each of two scenarios. This task requires comparison of the complicated Q solutions just
described, contrasting the base-case solution to the solution under a given scenario. But since
the outcome of each comparison depends on the magnitudes of ® and µ, which a®ect the Q
solutions, a necessary ¯rst step is to characterize the feasible parameter region, which contains
the admissible ® and µ values.
Three admissibility requirements must be satis¯ed in generating the feasible parameter
region. First, all of the equilibrium tra±c levels must be positive. Second, the marginal
cost of an extra passenger on each route must be positive, a condition that in turn implies
(via the ¯rst-order conditions) positivity of marginal revenue and hence the fare. Third, the
second-order conditions for the carrier maximization problems must be satis¯ed.
Consider the comparison of the base-case equilibrium to the equilibrium under scenario I.
Extensive analysis shows that if two particular admissibility conditions hold, then all of the
remaining admissibility requirements are automatically satis¯ed under both the base case and
scenario I. The ¯rst of these conditions is the nonnegativity requirement on Q
1;2;3;4
EF , which
says that EF interline tra±c under scenario I is nonnegative. The second condition is the
nonnegativity requirement for marginal cost on the AE route in the base case.10 When ®
and µ take values such that these two conditions hold, then analysis shows that all the other
admissibility conditions are automatically satis¯ed.
Figure 2 shows the resulting feasible parameter region. The lower boundary of the feasible
region is the locus of (µ; ®) combinations where Q
1;2;3;4
EF = 0, and the upper boundary is the
locus of parameter combinations where the AE route's marginal cost in the base case equals
zero. Any parameter combination between the upper and lower boundaries is admissible. For
earlier analyses that generate similar feasible regions, see Pels et al. (2000) and Brueckner
(2001).
4.2. Comparing equilibria
To compare the equilibrium outcomes at the market level between the base case and
scenario I, the following graphical procedure is used. First, focusing on the total tra±c level in
13a particular market, the di®erence between the base-case and scenario-I equilibrium values is





is denoted ¢QAD. This expression, which depends on ® and µ via the Q solutions, is set equal
to zero to produce an \equality" locus in (µ;®) space, along which ¢QAD = 0. Computations
show that ¢QAD is positive above the AD equality locus and negative below it.
Next, the AD equality locus is plotted along with the feasible region, and their relative
positions are compared. The resulting graph, shown in Figure 3, reveals that the equality
locus lies entirely below the feasible region. As a result, for all parameter combinations in the





AD). Since fares and tra±c are inversely related via the
demand curve, this conclusion also implies that that the AD fare is lower in the base case than
under scenario I.
Figure 3 also shows the equality locii for markets AC, AE, and AF, all of which similarly
lie below the feasible region. As a result, the previous conclusion applies for these markets as
well: total tra±c is higher and the fare lower in the base case than under scenario I. Analogous
graphs for the remaining city-pair markets are contained in the appendix, and they show
the same pattern, with all the equality locii lying below the feasible region.11 The following
conclusion is therefore established:
Proposition 1. Relative to the base case, a merger of the two European carriers along
with consolidation of the two transatlantic alliances leads, under scenario I, to lower
tra±c and higher fares in all city-pair markets except for AB, which is una®ected. As
a result, consumer welfare, as measured by consumer surplus, falls. Total pro¯t earned
by the four airlines rises as a result of the merger and alliance consolidation, but social
surplus, as measured by the sum of pro¯t and consumer surplus, falls.
Although the reduction in consumer surplus is an immediate consequence of lower tra±c
and higher fares, the results for pro¯t and social surplus are based on computations showing
that these measures are higherand lower, respectively, under scenario I throughout the feasible
region. Given the loss of competition in moving from the base case to scenario I, the increase
in carrier pro¯t comes as no surprise. However, the decline in social surplus shows that these
higher pro¯ts are not su±cient to o®set the reduction in consumer welfare.
14Exactly the same exercise can be carried out in comparing the equilibria under the base
case and scenario II.12 While details are not presented, the conclusions are the same as those
in Proposition 1:
Proposition 2. Relative to the base case, merger scenario II leads to lower tra±c
and higher fares in all city-pair markets except for AB, lower consumer surplus, higher
carrier pro¯ts, and lower social surplus.
Thus, the analysis con¯rms the conjecture stated at the end of section 2: the European airline
merger and the associated alliance consolidation are bad for consumers and for society as a
whole, but good for the airlines, regardless of whether scenario I or II is considered.
With comparisons to the base case covered by Propositions 1 and 2, a third exercise is to
compare the two merger outcomes themselves by contrasting the equilibria that emerge under
scenarios I and II. Using the same graphical methodology as before, the following conclusion
can be established:13
Proposition 3. While fares and tra±c levels in markets AB and CD are the same
under scenarios I and II, fares are typically higher and tra±c levels typically lower
in other markets under scenario II than under scenario I. The only exception to this
rule occurs in markets AC and BD, where scenario-II fares are lower and tra±c levels
higher over a small portion of the feasible region. Relative to scenario I, consumer
surplus is lower, carriers pro¯ts are higher, and social surplus is lower under scenario
II.
Thus, while usually amplifying scenario I's e®ects on fares and tra±c, scenario II is also worse
from the point of view of consumers and society as a whole.
In order gain a better understanding of the results summarized in Propositions 1, 2, and 3,
it is helpful to consider a numerical example based on representative values for the parameters
® and µ. Such an example is presented in the next section.
5. A Representative Numerical Example
Consider the parameter combination given by ® = 2:89 and µ = 0:11, which corresponds to
a point lying roughly in middle of the feasible region in Figure 2. Table 2 shows the resulting
equilibrium Q values and fares for the three cases, while Table 3 shows the welfare measures.
15Note that, while the Q values are shown at the airline level within each market, the market-
level Q's (which are the focus of Propositions) are easily inferred. Although the absolute
magnitudes of the solution values are not particularly meaningful, insight can be gained by
comparing these magnitudes across the three cases, as well as within each case.
5.1. Understanding the base case
Before comparing the results across cases, it is useful to consider the patterns of fares and
tra±c levels in the base case. These patterns, which are shown in the ¯rst panel of Table
2, highlight two separate factors that interact in determining the fare in a particular market.
The ¯rst factor is the extent of competition in the market, with greater competition naturally
leading to a lower fare, other things equal. The second factor is economies of tra±c density,
with higher densities on the route(s) carrying passengers in a market leading to lower cost per
passenger and hence a lower fare, other things equal.
Focusing intially on the domestic markets in the base case, note that the domestic interhub
markets AB and CD have identical fares and Q's, as do the domestic monopoly markets AE,
BE, CF, DF. The absence of competition in the latter markets puts upward pressure on the
fare, but since the routes to endpoints E and F carry tra±c in additional city-pair markets,
densities are higher than on the AB and CD routes. As a result, the absence of competition
in AE and the other similar markets is partially o®set by lower costs per passenger, leading to
fares that are not much higher than the domestic interhub fares (1.62 vs. 1.53).
Similarly, even though markets AD and BC are competitive like AB and CD, fares are
lower, and tra±c is higher, in these markets. The reason is that the AD and BC routes carry
tra±c in the DE and BF markets, respectively, along with tra±c in the AD and BC markets
themselves. As a result, densities are higher than on the AB and CD routes, yielding lower
costs per passenger and lower fares for AD and BC passengers.
Another notable feature of the solutions is the tra±c asymmetry between airlines 1 and
2 in markets CE. One reason for this asymmetry is the absence of any interline EF tra±c on
route BC, which tendsto reduce BC density relative to that on route AC. Anothercontributing
factor is that both markets that use route BC are competitive (markets BC and CE) while one
market that uses route AC is not (the AC market itself), a di®erence that tends to raise BC
16density relative to that on route AC. Under the given parameter values, the net e®ect of these
di®erences is to reduce tra±c density on route BC relative to that on route AC. This density
asymmetry, in turn, gives airline 1 a cost advantage over carrier 2 in competing for CE tra±c,
which is re°ected in a higher tra±c level for 1. The positions of airlines 1 and 2 are reversed
in market DE, giving 2 the higher tra±c level. All of these asymmetries are repeated markets
AF and BF, yielding di®erent tra±c levels for airlines 3 and 4.
Next, observe that, while markets AC and BD are similar to monopoly markets like AE
in their lack of competition, the former markets have higher fares and lower tra±c levels. One
reason for this outcome is that, relative to routes AC and BD, a route like AE carries tra±c
in four rather than three city pair markets and thus has a higher density (such a route also
carries all of its alliance's interline tra±c rather than half; see (2)). In addition, rather than
being concentrated on a single monopoly airline, tra±c in a market like AC is split between
two colluding carriers, limiting exploitation of economies of density and thus raising costs. For
both reasons, the fare is higher, and tra±c lower, in markets AC and BD than in the pure
monopoly markets.
Finally, market EF has the highest fare and the lowest total tra±c of any city-pair market.
Although this market bene¯ts from interalliance competition, cost per passenger is the highest
ofany marketgiven the need to travel acrossthree routes in makingan EF trip. Note, however,
that despite these higher costs, the EF interline fare is only slightly higher than the fares for
other, shorter international trips. This pricing outcome appears to be realistic and is a typical
property of models like the present one (see Brueckner (2001)).
5.2. Scenario I
With this background, consider the e®ects on the equilibrium levels of tra±c and fares of
moving from the base case to scenario I. The second panel of Table 2 shows that fares rise
and total tra±c levels fall in all city-pair markets except AB, as stated in Proposition 1.14 To
understand these changes, consider ¯rst the European interhub market CD, where carriers 3
and 4 now collude rather than compete. The fare in this market rises dramatically and tra±c
falls. Similarly, in markets AF and BF, where airlines 3 and 4 now collude, fares again rise and
tra±c levels decline. Note that AF and BF tra±c is now symmetric across carriers 3 and 4 as
17a result of the assumption that, in colluding, they evenly split passengers in these markets. In
market EF, where interalliance competition disappears, the fare again rises while tra±c falls.
Although competition is unchanged in all other city-pair markets, the downward pressure
on tra±c in markets AF, BF, and EF generates negative spillovers that raise fares and reduce
tra±c everywhere except in market AB. To understand these e®ects, note ¯rst that the tra±c
losses in markets EF and AF reduce densities on route AC for carrier 1 and on routes AC and
CF for carrier 3. By raising cost per passenger, these changes tend to raise fares and reduce
tra±c in markets AC and CF even though competition is unchanged. Similarly, the tra±c
losses in markets EF and BF reduce densities on route BD for carrier 2 and on routes BD
and DF for carrier 4, changes that tend to raise fares and reduce tra±c in markets BD and
DF. The resulting density losses on the AC, CF, BD, and DF routes compound those already
caused by lower AF, BF and EF tra±c.
Higher fares in markets AF and BF also reduce the tra±c that °ows along routes AD and
BC on carriers 4 and 3, cutting densities. The resulting increase in cost per passenger for these
two carriers tends to raise fares and reduce total tra±c in markets AD and BC, compounding
the carriers' density losses on these routes. However, because airlines 1 and 2 lack a source of
upward pressure on cost per passenger on routes AD and BC (i.e., no externally-caused loss of
densities), their tra±c levels in markets AD and BC rise in response to the increase in fares,
as can be seen from Table 2.
While these higher tra±c levels tend to increase AD and BC densities for carriers 1 and
2, the drop in EF tra±c tends to reduce their densities on routes AE and BE. These lower
densities in turn tend to increase AE and BE fares while reducing tra±c in these markets. In
addition, the density losses on routes AE and BE are large enough relative to the gains on AD
and BC to raise the overall costs of serving passengers in markets CE and DE, so that fares
in these markets rise and tra±c levels fall. While all of these density and tra±c changes have
been described sequentially across routes for heuristic reasons, it is important to recognize that
they are mutually reinforcing and simultaneous, being determined by the model's equilibrium
conditions.
Although spillovers from lost competition in markets EF, AF and BF thus raise fares and
18reduce tra±c elsewhere, the one market that is insulated from these e®ects is AB, where the
fare and tra±c remain the same as in the base case. The reason for this outcome is that, since
the AB route carries tra±c only in the AB city-pair market, its density level is una®ected by
tra±c changes in other markets.15
Finally, Table 3 shows the welfare e®ects of moving from the base case to scenario I. With
fares rising and tra±c falling in each market except for AB, consumer surplus declines. Pro¯t
levels for the individual airlines rise, with carriers 3 and 4 reaping the largest increases as a
result of their individual collusion. Because the decline in consumer surplus is larger than the
increase in total pro¯t, social surplus declines under scenario I.
5.3. Scenario II
The third panel of Table 2 shows the equilibrium tra±c levels and fares under scenario II,
where collusion is introduced in markets AD and BC, and where EF interline tra±c is split
four ways. As can be seen from the Table, movement to scenario II ampli¯es the changes
already seen in moving to scenario I, with fares increasing further in the a®ected markets and
tra±c showing additional declines. As a result, relative to the base case, fares are higher and
market-level tra±c is lower in all city-pair markets except for AB under scenario II, as stated
in Proposition 2.16
Because markets AB and CD are insulated from the e®ects of the scenario II changes,
their fares and tra±c levels remain the same as in scenario I. To understand the e®ects in
other markets, observe from Table 2 that collusion in markets AD and BC dramatically raises
fares and lowers tra±c levels in these markets, changes that reduce densities on the AD and
BC routes. These density reductions in turn tend to raise fares and reduce total tra±c levels
in the other markets that use the AD and BC routes (CE, DE, AF, BF).
However, as discussed above, higher fares in these markets tend to elicit a higher (not
lower) tra±c level from the carrier not experiencing an externally-caused density loss, despite
the overall drop in market tra±c. For example, since carrier 1's densities and hence costs are
not directly a®ected by collusion between airlines 2 and 4 in market BC, the higher CE fare
described above tendsto spur an increase in 1's tra±c level in the CE market. Such an increase
in turn tends to raise carrier 1's density on the AC route, tending to reduce fares and raise
19tra±c in the AC market. Parallel observations apply to the BD market.17
A countervailing force, however, is the AC density loss caused by shifting EF interline
tra±c to routes AD and BC. If EF tra±c is large, then this tra±c loss is su±cient to nullify
the gain in 1's AC density described above, so that the fare rises and tra±c falls in both
markets AC and CE. The CE tra±c loss, in turn, reduces density on route AE, tending to
raise the fare and reduce tra±c in market AE. With parallel negative density e®ects felt on
routes BD, BE, CF and DF, fares rise and tra±c falls in all remaining city-pair markets aside
from AB and CD.
While this type of outcome is the one shown in Table 2, di®erent parameter values can
generate an outcome where AC and BD tra±c are higherunderscenario II than underscenario
I (recall Proposition 3). Such an outcome occurs for (µ; ®) combinations near the bottom edge
of the relevant feasible region, where EF interline tra±c is near zero and the loss of a portion
of that tra±c from routes AC and BD is inconsequential. However, the set of parameter values
leading to such an outcome represents a very small portion of the feasible region, so that the
outcome in Table 2 can be viewed as representative.
Finally, Table 3 shows that consumer surplus falls further under scenario II, while airline
pro¯t rises above the scenario-I level. Since the additional surplus decline is larger than the
pro¯t increase, social surplus is lower than in scenario I.
6. Conclusion
This paperhasexplored the e®ects of a European airline mergerfollowed by a consolidation
of two competing international alliances. The exercise has been inspired by the Air France-
KLM merger, which is expected to spur consolidation of the Northwest-KLM and SkyTeam
alliances into a single mega-alliance. The results of the analysis show that, although the
airlines bene¯t through higher pro¯ts, the merger and alliance consolidation harm consumers
while reducing overall social surplus. The reason for this negative outcome is that, as modeled,
all the e®ects of the merger and alliance consolidation are anticompetitive. First, the European
merger reduces domestic competition as well as competition in markets that connect interior
European endpoints to US hubs, markets that are served in the model solely by European
20carriers. Second, alliance consolidation reduces competition in the market connecting interior
US to interior European endpoints, a market that relies on interline service provided by US and
European alliance partners. In the model, creation of a mega-alliance eliminates the previous
interalliance competition for passengers in such markets, leading to higher interline fares and
lower welfare for these passengers. Creation of a mega-alliance also leads to new collusion
on transatlantic interhub routes that were previously served by competing US and European
carriers from di®erent alliances.
In appraising these results, it is important to ask whether key sources of bene¯ts have been
omitted from the analysis. In the interest of realism in depicting the Air France-KLM case,
one possible source of bene¯ts is indeed absent from the model. In particular, following the
merger, the European interhub market (CD in the model) is served by two separate airlines
who collude in setting fares but sacri¯ce economies of density by splitting the market. While
this depiction accurately represents the initial stages of the Air France-KLM merger, where
both airlines are expected to preserve their identities, the carriers will eventually be blended
into a single entity. By allowing better exploitation of economies of density, this change will
enhance e±ciency and thus o®set some of the negative e®ects of lost competition.18 However,
since such e±ciency gains are unlikely to fully reverse the merger's anticompetitive e®ect,
the negative verdict of the present analysis would be softened but not overturned. However,
other cost-reducing synergies not captured by the simple model developed in the paper may
be present, further softening and perhaps reversing the negative view of the merger's domestic
impact.
Another omitted potential source of gains relates to interline passengers. In the model,
all interline tra±c is carried by alliances in the premerger situation. However, in reality, it
is possible that some passengers who currently make nonalliance interline trips would have
access to alliance service following creation of the mega-alliance. As explained in the introduc-
tion, such passengers would bene¯t from lower fares as well as greater travel convenience. In
particular, residents of a US endpoint served by Northwest may need to travel to a European
(or perhaps African, Middle Eastern, or Indian) endpoint served by Air France but not by
KLM. Under the current situation, such a passenger would need to make a nonalliance trip
21on Northwest and Air France, whereas alliance travel would be possible following creation of
the mega-alliance. The same gain would accrue to a resident of a US city served by Delta and
not by Northwest who needs to travel to an endpoint served by KLM but not by Air France.
However, given the extensive domestic service provided by each US carrier, as well as the fair
degree of overlap in the European and international route systems of Air France and KLM,
the number of passengers ¯tting the above criteria is no doubt small. As a result, the gains
from this source are not likely to be large.19
Thus, while e±ciency gains may partly soften the domestic anticompetitive e®ects of a
merger like the one involving Air France and KLM, justifying this movement toward European
airline consolidation, the paper's negative verdict on creation of a mega-alliance appears to
be more robust. In particular, it is di±cult to identify any sign¯cant positive e®ect from
such an alliance consolidation. As a result, while arguments can be made in support of the
recent regulatory approval of the Air France-KLM merger, similar approval of a mega-alliance
that blends the Northwest-KLM and SkyTeam alliances when KLM continues to exist as a
separate entity would be hard to justify. Thus, while regulators might be unable to block a
super¯cial marketing arrangement involving this large group of carriers, it may be unwise to
grant antitrust immunity to Northwest and Air France and to Delta and KLM. Doing so would
unleash the some of the anticompetitive forces highlighted in the present analysis.
22Table 1
Market Structures
Base Case Scenario I Scenario II
market airlines behavior airlines behavior airlines behavior
AB 1,2 compete 1,2 compete 1,2 compete
AC 1,3 collude 1,3 collude 1,3 collude
AD 1,4 compete 1,4 compete 1,4 collude
AE 1 monopoly 1 monopoly 1 monopoly
AF 3,4 compete 3,4 collude 3,4 collude
BC 2,3 compete 2,3 compete 2,3 collude
BD 2,4 collude 2,4 collude 2,4 collude
BE 2 monopoly 2 monopoly 2 monopoly
BF 3,4 compete 3,4 collude 3,4 collude
CD 3,4 compete 3,4 collude 3,4 collude
CE 1,2 compete 1,2 compete 1,2 compete
CF 3 monopoly 3 monopoly 3 monopoly
DE 1,2 compete 1,2 compete 1,2 compete
DF 4 monopoly 4 monopoly 4 monopoly
EF¤ 1+3, 2+4 compete 1+3, 2+4 collude 1+3, 2+4, collude
1+4, 2+3
¤In market EF, `+' indicates that two airlines are joint providers of interline service.
Competition in the base case occurs between the two sets of interline partners.
23Table 2
Equilibrium Tra±c Levels and Fares
(µ = 0:11; ® = 2:89)
Base Case
AB AC AD AE AF BC BD BE BF CD CE CF DE DF EF
Tra±c:
airline 1 1.36 1.10 1.45 2.54 - - - - - - 1.24 - 1.20 - 0.50
airline 2 1.36 - - - - 1.45 1.10 2.54 - - 1.20 - 1.24 - 0.50
airline 3 - 1.10 - - 1.24 1.45 - - 1.20 1.36 - 2.54 - - 0.50
airline 4 - - 1.45 - 1.20 - 1.10 - 1.24 1.36 - - - 2.54 0.50
Fares:
all 1.53 1.79 1.44 1.62 1.67 1.44 1.79 1.62 1.67 1.53 1.67 1.62 1.67 1.62 1.90
Scenario I
AB AC AD AE AF BC BD BE BF CD CE CF DE DF EF
Tra±c:
airline 1 1.36 1.07 1.49 2.48 - - - - - - 1.16 - 1.19 - 0.31
airline 2 1.36 - - - - 1.49 1.07 2.48 - - 1.19 - 1.16 - 0.31
airline 3 - 1.07 - - 0.82 1.38 - - 0.82 1.00 - 2.39 - - 0.31
airline 4 - - 1.38 - 0.82 - 1.07 - 0.82 1.00 - - - 2.39 0.31
Fares:
all 1.53 1.82 1.45 1.65 2.07 1.45 1.82 1.65 2.07 1.89 1.72 1.69 1.72 1.69 2.27
Scenario II
AB AC AD AE AF BC BD BE BF CD CE CF DE DF EF
Tra±c:
airline 1 1.36 1.06 1.06 2.47 - - - - - - 1.15 - 1.15 - 0.30
airline 2 1.36 - - - - 1.06 1.06 2.47 - - 1.15 - 1.15 - 0.30
airline 3 - 1.06 - - 0.80 1.06 - - 0.80 1.00 - 2.39 - - 0.30
airline 4 - - 1.06 - 0.80 - 1.06 - 0.80 1.00 - - - 2.39 0.30
Fares:
all 1.53 1.83 1.83 1.65 2.09 1.83 1.83 1.65 2.09 1.89 1.74 1.70 1.74 1.70 2.29
24Table 3
Welfare Measures
(µ = 0:11; ® = 2:89)
Base Case Scenario I Scenario II
consumer surplus 84.83 77.73 74.84
pro¯t 1 5.30 5.44 5.55
pro¯t 2 5.30 5.44 5.55
pro¯t 3 5.30 5.70 5.88
pro¯t 4 5.30 5.70 5.88
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27Footnotes
¤We thank Tom Whalen for comments. Any errors or shortcomings in the paper, however,
are our responsibility.
1Similar spillovers are present in the analysis of Brueckner and Spiller (1991).
2For a nontechnical overview of this research, see Brueckner (2003b). For other research on
alliances, see the book by Oum, Park and Zhang (2000), which summarizes research from
a large number of journal articles on this subject written by the authors (citations can be
found in the book). For other accessible overview pieces see Oum and Park (1997) and Pels
(2001). For research on alliances outside the economics literature, see Youssef and Hansen
(1994), Bissessur and Alamdari (1998), and Dennis (2000).
3A reader not interested in technical details can skip this section as well as subsection 4.1
without loss of continuity.
4It should be noted the equal division of AC and EF interline tra±c between carriers 1 and
3 on route AC in (2) does not maximize their combined pro¯t. Given economies of tra±c
density, the proper tra±c allocation would concentrate on a single carrier all AC tra±c and
all EF interline tra±c on the AC route. However, given that carriers 1 and 3 remain separate
despite their alliance partnership, this kind of extreme tra±c allocation is untenable. The
equal-split rule is imposed as realistic constraint on the operation of their alliance.




EF are not be
repeated in listing carrier 3's optimality conditions. As a result, carriers 1 and 3 contribute
a total of 12 conditions to the complete set (carriers 2 and 4 also contribute 12 conditions).
6By fully exploiting economies of density, the interline tra±c allocation that would maximize
the combined pro¯t of the four carriers would concentrate all of the tra±c on three routes
(for example, AE, AC (using either 1 or 3 but not both), and CF). Again, this allocation is
unrealistic.
7Note that AF tra±c is equally allocated to routes AC and AD in (8), while BF tra±c is
equally allocated to BC and BD. Again, this allocation will not maximize the combined
pro¯t of carriers 3 and 4 but seems realistic given the maintenance of separate identities for
the carriers.
8As observed previously, while EF interline tra±c should be concentrated on one set of routes
28to maximize combined carrier pro¯t, a four-way split is more realistic.
9It should be noted thatany ¯xed costsofoperating aroute are suppressed in this formulation,
without loss of generality. While route ¯xed costs should be considered in analyzing an
airline's choice of network structure, where the number of routes is endogenous, the route
number is ¯xed at four for each airline in the present model. As a result, the magnitude of
¯xed costs is inconsequential, generating a constant that is subtracted from pro¯t in each
case. Thus, ¯xed costs can be conveniently set at zero. To see how the level of ¯xed costs
can a®ect network structure, see Pels, Nijkamp and Rietveld (2001).






11Since the ¢QCE and ¢QEF locii nearly coincide, they appear to be one curve in Figure A2
even though they are distinct (the ¢QCE and ¢QDE locii are identical).
12The relevant feasible region is the set of parameter values generating admissible solutions
under both the base case and scenario II.
13The relevant feasible region is the set of parameter values generating admissible solutions
under both the base case and scenarios I and II.
14Note that BC tra±c on carrier 2 and AD tra±c on carrier 1 is higher under scenario I than
in the base case. Total tra±c in each of these markets is lower, however, under scenario I,
as stated in Proposition 1.
15One additional di®erence relative to the base case is that CE tra±c is now higher on airline
2 than on airline 1. This outcome re°ects a di®erent net e®ect of the forces discussed above,
which leads to higherratherthan lower tra±c density on route BC than on AC, giving airline
2 a cost advantage in competing for CE tra±c. Parallel comments apply to market DE.
16Note that, because of a round-o® convention, fares or tra±c appear to be same between
the scenarios in a few cases. However, either the fare or tra±c value di®ers in every case,
showing that the other variable would di®er as well if expanded to include more signi¯cant
digits.
17Analogous forces generated by collusion in the AD market tend to raise carrier 2's density
on the BD route, tending to reduce fares and increase tra±c in the BD market.
18These countervailing e®ects of airline mergers are analyzed by Brueckner and Spiller (1991,
291994). For additional discussion of mergers, see Han and Singal (1993) and Morrison and
Winston (1995).
19The analysis misses another potential bene¯t of a mega-alliance. In particular, in contrast
to the assumptions of the model, Air France does not currently provide service to Detroit,
while KLM does not serve Atlanta. As a result, the European carriers do not provide service
on the AD and BC routes in the model, and formation of the mega-alliance would probably
lead to bene¯cial introduction of such service.
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